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Abstract 
 
To ensure stable and resilient banking system in any economy, corporate governance 
considered as an effective tool. Although in 2006 the first corporate governance code 
was introduced in Bangladesh, it brings awareness among various stakeholders of the 
industry within very short time. However the Corporate governance code was revised in 
2012 after the Bangladesh capital market slump in 2011. It is expected that all the 
stakeholders in the industry will be benefited by adopting the revised guidelines but 
during the period 2010 to 2015, the non- performing loans (NPL) has increased 
significantly and the Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) of the banking 
industry has observed negative growth. Therefore the concern is that, why banks asset 
quality continuously deteriorated despite of enhancing the internal monitoring 
mechanisms like increasing more independent directors in the Board, strengthening the 
audit committee, specifying the CEO’s responsibility and so on. In this regard, this 
thesis aims to investigate the relationship between bank performance and corporate 
governance through theoretical and empirical analysis. While theoretical analysis, this 
research critically analyzed the contemporary corporate governance theories and various 
role of board sub-committees from bank’s strategic point of view. This research also 
briefly discussed about the evolution process of corporate governance in globally and 
Bangladesh perspective. On the other hand, while empirical analysis, the research has 
considered secondary data for six years (2010–2015) of 21 commercial bank of 
Bangladesh and Bangladesh economy. It is hypothesized that there is positive relation 
between corporate governance and bank performance. In order to test the hypothesis, it 
uses the Ordinary least square (OLS) method to test the relationship between five 
x 
indicators of corporate governance guidelines and four basic bank performance 
indicators. One major finding in this research is that, the board size is positively 
correlated with the bank performance and statistically significant. This indicates that the 
board size can improve the bank performance. In addition, it was found that the 
independent director’s size has significant impact on bank performance. It was found 
that despite of appointment of independent directors bank performance further 
deteriorating during the period 2013-2015. One reason may be the independent directors 
were appointed within the same board size after adopting the code but due to banks 
ownership structure, they cannot fully control over board and management. Another 
reason may be the country’s economic indicators also shows negative trend during 
2013-2015 except GDP (which slightly enhanced in 2013-2015 comparing to 2010-
2012), which contributed negatively for bank performance. Based on the theoretical and 
empirical analysis, this thesis advocates that, the adoption of corporate governance code 
has contributed to stop further distortion of performance of banks and independent 
directors play a positive role within the limited scope. However this research argues that 
as the implementation of corporate governance in Bangladesh is in early stage; there are  
scopes to develop the code specifically which are mentioned in the recommendation 
part of this thesis and the corporate governance codes should be critically analyzed and 
monitored by the regulatory bodies and stakeholders periodically. Besides this, it seems, 
it is too early to judge the impacts of newly introduced corporate governance guidelines 
over the bank performance as other factors like low growth rate in credit demand due to 
global economic recession, domestic political unrest and strict regulation imposed by 
central bank during the observed period are also contributed largely on the bank 
performance.  
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Chapter One- Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
For stable and resilient banking system the essence of good governance system is a much 
talked issue. Although the first corporate governance code was started to implement in 
Bangladesh in 2006, it brings awesome awareness among various stakeholders of the 
industry. Corporate governance practices of Bangladeshi banks have been significantly 
improved since the commencing the corporate governance code (Islam et al., 2015).  
 
Banking industry plays an important role in the economy. Therefore, banks performance is 
also a major concern for economic development. Banks performance attracts significant 
attention from public and financial regulators as banks are critical institutions in most 
economies (Stankeviciene et al. 2012). Any disturbance of banking sector in Bangladesh 
can severely paralyzed the whole economy (Uddin and Bristy, 2014). There is a significant 
relationship between corporate accrual and general public ownership and the immoral 
management takes the advantages of information asymmetry while preparing the corporate 
reports (Hasan et al. 2014). Independence of banking supervisors, independence from 
political influence and strong legal protection against the authority of the supervisors are 
key challenges in good governance in banking industry in Bangladesh (Yusuf Kamal et 
al.2007).  
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Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) and Bangladesh Bank, the 
central bank of Bangladesh, are the chief regulator of the country’s capital market and 
money market respectively. However, both regulators issues specific guidelines regarding 
banks governance system from time to time to protect the investors and depositors interest. 
Therefore, there need to justify the guidelines issued on corporate governance that, what is 
the impact of those guidelines on industry performance. Besides the existing corporate 
governance code in Bangladesh is applicable since 2012 but the trend of non-performing 
Loans (NPL) for the last six years has an upward trend (Table 1.1). It is assumed that if 
corporate governance has positive impacts on the decision making process of the Board of 
Directors then it should positively reflects on the bank asset quality. Therefore, it is 
required to analysis the corporate governance guideline so that its impact on the banks 
would be more evident as well as create value to the organization.   
 
 
Table 1.1 Gross Non- performing Loans (NPL) Ratio (Gross NPL as a percentage of  
Total Loans outstanding) 
 
Banks Type Dec 
2010 
Dec 
2011 
Dec 
2012 
Dec 
2013 
Dec 
2014 
Dec 
2015 
State Owned 
Commercial Banks  
15.7 11.3 23.9 18.8 22.4 21.5 
Private Commercial 
Banks  
3.2 2.9 4.6 4.5 5 4.8 
Foreign Commercial 
Banks 
3 3 3.5 5.5 7.3 7.8 
Specialized 
Development Banks 
24.2 24.6 26.8 34.7 32.8 23.2 
Overall  7.1 6.2 10 8.9 9.7 8.8 
(Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2014-15, Financial Stability Report 2015) 
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1.2 Statement of problem  
 
Before discussing the problem statement of this thesis, we would like to address some key 
issues.  
First of all, banking industry in Bangladesh is formed by banking companies act 1991 
(Amended in 2013) and regulated by Bangladesh Bank. However, the state owned banks 
(SOBs) and Specialized Development Banks (SDBs) are dually supervised by Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) and Bangladesh Bank. On the other hand, all the listed companies in the 
burses are monitored and supervised by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
(BSEC). Therefore, while BSEC issued Corporate Governance guidelines in the year 2006 
and later on in 2012 for listed companies in the burses, it is also applicable to the Banking 
companies that are listed in the stock exchanges. On the other hand Bangladesh Banks has 
also issued detailed guidelines on Board of Directors appointment, responsibilities and also 
the internal governance system of the bank from time to time which are mandatory to 
comply by all scheduled banks. As a result there are dual supervisory authorities exists in 
banking industry of Bangladesh regarding Corporate Governance.  
 
Besides this, there is a loophole in appointment of Independent Directors in the Board. 
Listed companies in Bangladesh are not free from prototype of family business governance 
(Asian Development Bank 2003). It is observed that most of the independent directors in 
the board are comes from the relatives and peers circle of the sponsor directors. In addition, 
independent directors in the state owned commercial banks (SCBs) are nominated by MoF.  
As a result the conflict of interest has risen for such appointment and the Independent 
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directors cannot play role in favor of general shareholders. Therefore, it is a concern that to 
what extent independent directors are truly independent in nature. What is more, another 
drawback of the existing corporate governance guideline in that, there is no provision to 
impose penalty for non-compliance of the guideline.  
 
Last but not least, the restructuring facility of Bangladesh Bank for large loans has 
significant role to downsizing the NPL ratio in the banking industry. The banking industry 
reschedules and/or restructures a portion of their stressed loans at the end of each year, 
which inflates banks' profitability and reduces provision requirements (Bangladesh Bank 
2015). Weak bank balance sheets and governance issues reduce lending capacity, take 
credit away from productive investment, and, in the case of State owned banks, can lead to 
fiscal recapitalization costs (IMF -2015) 
 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The objective of this research is to find out the impact of corporate governance on bank 
performance especially for private commercial banks just after adaptation of the corporate 
governance guidelines. 
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1.4 Research Questions  
 
There are two core research questions in this research  
1. What are the key elements or critical factors in the corporate governance 
guidelines of Bangladesh? Through this question we will try to find out the key 
element of the existing guidelines that play a vital role in banks performance. 
 
2. Is there any relation between corporate governance and bank performance? 
This question investigates the relationship and impact of governance system on 
bank performance.  
 
To address these two questions there also some sub-questions that is related to the core 
questions.  
i) What is corporate governance in banks? 
ii) What are the basic performance measurement yardsticks for measuring banking 
industry performance?  
iii) To what extent Basel accord implementation in Bangladesh enhanced the 
monitoring skills of the banks?   
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1.5 Hypothesis and Justification 
 
To answer the research questions we hypothesize that  
1. There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance. If the code are properly addressed by the regulatory authority and duly 
complied by the banks, then the performance will be boost up. 
2. Another hypothesis is that implementation of Basel accord in Bangladesh is not so 
successful to ensure the improving asset quality in the banking sector. 
 
 
1.5.1 Justification of the hypothesis 
 
An empirical study was conducted on the relationship between corporate governance and 
banking sector in Malaysia and Vietnam by Dao and Dao (2014). This research also 
followed the same methodologies as followed by Dao and Dao (2014), where they find 
that, introducing of corporate governance code in Malaysia and Vietnam has positive 
impact on ROE, ROA of banks in both countries. They also consider Malaysian and 
Vietnamese commercial banks data as sample size in their empirical research. In this 
research we also consider board size and its composition as corporate governance attribute 
and ROA, ROE as bank performance measurement. Additionally in this study we also 
consider only commercial banks data. Therefore it is justified to take same methodology of 
Dao and Dao (2014).    
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Regarding second hypothesis, we assume that the  risk weighted assets (RWA) have a 
negative relationship with Gross NPL but Roy (2016), finds that despite of low RWA , 
Indian banks has high Gross NPL, which indicate that although the banks has maintained 
its Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) as per Basel II standard but it failed to control its asset 
quality. Bangladesh banking industry has also experiencing same situation. Bangladesh has 
successfully run Basel II during the period 2010 to 2015 but the implication of Basel II 
accord on assets quality is not visible.   
 
 
1.6 Overview of the Methodology 
 
 
 In order to answer the first question this study will overview the history, 
background and current guidelines of Corporate Governance in Bangladesh. 
 In order to answering the second question, we will use empirical data of Banking 
industry of Bangladesh for last six years (2010-2015) and latest Corporate 
Governance (CG) code that issued by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC)  
 In order to answer the sub questions, this study will describe the benchmark for 
performance measurement yardstick of banking industry. This study will also 
analyze the Japan’s financial and governance system as a case analysis of transition 
into Anglo American System. 
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1.7 Limitation of this research 
 
Times series of data is the main limitation of this research. It considers only six year’s data 
for bank performance and economic indicators of the economy while regression analysis. In 
fact such short time is not sufficient to judge the whole bank performance and the corporate 
governance attributes. Another limitation of the study is that, this research considers 
corporate governance attributes while accessing bank performance. But there are several 
factors such market competition, credit growth rate, political stability are also influences 
bank performance. Another limitation is that this research excluded the state owned banks 
and foreign commercial Banks in the sample bank data base as the majority shareholder of 
these institutions are government and foreign parent companies respectively. 
 
 
 
 
1.8 Disposition 
 
The disposition of the thesis is as follows:  
The introduction chapter includes the background of the study, problem statement, research 
question, research hypothesis and justification and limitation of the study. 
 
Corporate governance and its different theories, conceptual frame work of corporate 
governance, financial institutions governance system, and performance yardsticks for 
financial institutions are discussed in the second chapter. 
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In the third chapter, evolution of corporate governance code, role of different committees of 
board of directors are discussed.  Besides the Japanese financial system and Basel Accord 
implementation in Japan are also discussed in this chapter as a case study. 
 
Overview of Bangladesh Banking industry and governance system discussed in detailed in 
the fourth chapter. Research methods and discussion on empirical results are briefly 
described in the fifth and sixth chapter respectively. Finally, the recommendations of the 
whole research are discussed in the last chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
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Chapter Two - Literature review 
 
1.1 What is Corporate Governance? 
 
The basis of corporate governance comes from the agency problem. One of the ingredient 
in the survival of modern corporation is to separate the ownership and managerial control 
(Fama, 1980). 
Survival of organizational forms largely depends on the controlling of agency problem 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Corporate governance deals with agency problem and legal 
protection to investors’ rights and concentration or ownership are the approaches to 
corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Corporate governance affects the 
asymmetric information of IPO- stage firms (Lucian 2002). Corporate governance helps to 
mitigate the influence of the agency problem on managers cost adjustment decisions (Chen 
et al. 2012). Corporate Governance is beyond mere code compliance and box ticking 
(Christopher Halburd, 2014). Good Corporate governance which includes meaningful 
corporate transparency, improves the function of the real economy, corporate resource 
allocation and security market efficiency (James L. Bicksler, 2003)."Corporate governance" 
is connected with the board and its activities from the perspective of the personal 
characteristics and role of individual board members based on their perception of the 
character of human beings. (Marie 2014). The building blocks of corporate governance are 
accountability , probity and transparency and four  parties such as owners, directors, 
legislators and regulators are  responsible for effective corporate governance (Bob Garratt, 
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2015). Corporate governance largely influences the factors that affects firms value (Lucina 
et al.2009). Governance policies enable an individual corporation to operate effectively 
(William, 2014). 
 
According to Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) of Bank of England,   
“Good governance is important for all regulated firms, although the degree of supervisory 
attention paid to governance issues for particular firms may vary according to the risk 
profile of the firm and the potential impact of failure. Equally, judgments on the adequacy 
of governance arrangements may be influenced by the culture, management incentives and 
business goals of the firm”. (PRA, 2015) 
 
From the institutional point of view , corporate governance create long term value 
creation to all shareholders and it act as an mediator of communication  between the 
investors and the companies they own. (NYSE, 2014)   
 
According to Guideline on Corporate governance Banks published by Banks for 
International Settlements (BASEL),  
 
“Corporate governance determines the allocation of authority and responsibility by which 
the business and affairs of a bank are carried out by its board and senior management, 
including  
 to set the bank’s strategy and objectives 
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 select and oversee  personnel,  
 operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis, 
 protect the interest of depositors, meet shareholder obligations, and take into 
account the interests of other recognized stakeholders ,  
 align corporate culture , corporate activities and behavior with the expectation that 
the bank will operate in a safe and sound manner, with integrity and incompliance 
with applicable laws and regulations ”. 
(Basel 2015 a) 
 
 
2.2 Theories of Corporate Governance 
 
There are a number of theories behind the corporate governance evolvement. Conventional 
corporate governance theories can be broadly classified into three and these are agency 
theory, stewardship theory and stakeholder theory (Sheila et.al, 2013). In the following 
subsections we will elaborate the contemporary theories of corporate governance.  
 
 
2.2.1 Agency theory 
 
Agency theory based upon the principal-agent agreement and relationship. In any 
corporation the owners and the managers have different organizational objectives, whereas 
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owners seek the long term value creation and managers want to maximize their incentives. 
However, the relationship should be instrumentals in a rationale way to smooth running the 
organization. In this sense owners are considered as principal and managers are considered 
as agent. Alchian, A. & Demsetz, H. (1972), refers the relationship between owners and 
managers as “team productive process” where firm owner and managers work together with 
contractual arrangement. Jensen and Meckling (1976) briefly discussed about the agency 
cost that arises while separation of ownership and control. Fama (1980) emphasizes that the 
incentives for owners and managers are determined and resolved by market competition. If 
we consider the relationship between shareholders/common equity holders and Board of 
Directors, there also principal–agent relationship exists. Directors are appointed by the 
Shareholders to meet their expectation from the firms. In this case, the agency cost is 
directors’ fees and other incentives received from the firm. In short, we can say that in 
agency theory principal delegates responsibility to the agent through mentoring and 
monitoring mechanism. Conflict or distrust arises because of opportunism of managers as 
behavioral theorists’ advocates.  Another reason for Principal-agent conflicts may be agents 
sometimes seem to be risk averse if their incentives will be lower than principal incentives. 
Mainly to avoid these two major conflicts in principal-agent relationship governance 
mechanism has developed.  
 
Agency cost is main concern in agency theory. To minimize the agency cost, code of 
corporate practices developed and executive compensations are sometimes aligns with the 
firm’s performance. Although it is difficult to judge the appropriate incentive package 
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compatible to agents but in recent years in the United States and European firms are widely 
exercising the executive compensation package to control agent behavior. Conyon and 
Schwalbach (2000) found that there is positive relation between the executive pay and 
company performance in some UK and German companies. Although there is different 
governance model used in UK and Germany, but to solve the agency problem same 
executive compensation worked in both countries. On the other hand, Rashid (2015) found 
that, to some extent a firm’s agency cost can be reduced by appointing independent 
directors in the board. Institutional investors who invest in the firm from their own 
perspectives can also reduce the agency problem by closely monitoring the firm’s activities 
as they equip with professional experience and expertise.  
 
 
2.2.2 Transaction cost economics theory 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory views the firm as governance structure whereas 
agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contacts (Mallin, 2010). The work of 
Williamson (1984) largely contributed to the TCE theory. Hart (1995) argument also 
contributed the TCE theory further development. He also pointed out some limitation such 
as , “the contract will have gaps and missing provisions - future actions will be specified 
only partly and in some cases not at all”. 
Williamson (1984) advocates that it is difficult to craft a governance structure for managers 
as they are more firm specific rather they should include in the board which helps board to 
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take superior decision as there is less information gap. Hence the cost of information can be 
reduced. The control of managerial behavior in such case, firm can introduce two-tier board 
system (Williamson ,1984). TCE theory attempts to reconcile the bounded rationality and 
opportunism of managerial behavior in a more pragmatic way.   
Comparing with TCE and agency theory, Solomon (2010) point out that “transaction 
theory assumes people are often opportunistic, whereas agency theory discusses moral 
hazard and agency costs. Another difference is that, the unit of analysis in agency theory is 
the individual agent, whereas in transaction cost theory the unit of analysis is the 
transaction. However both theories attempt to tackle the same problem: how do we 
persuade company management to pursue shareholders interest and shareholders profit 
maximizations”.   
 
 
2.2.3 Stewardship theory 
 
Stewardship theory emphasizes on collectiveness to achieve the organizational goals. 
Stewardship theory was promoted by Donaldson and Davis as an alternative to agency 
theory (Mallin, 2010). Donaldson et al., (1991) refers CEO’s role in the board as supportive 
to the governance and as a man of less opportunistic. Where the CEO and Board Chairman 
is same person in an organization, the agency conflict is not exist in the firm. Return to 
shareholders is improved by combining, rather than by separating the role of chair and CEO 
position (Donaldson et al.,1991). Stewardship theory emphasizes on behavioral aspects of 
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manger rather than contractual arrangement or rationality to judge the managerial 
responsibility. Therefore the monetary benefit that the firm attains through stewardship 
theory is less monitoring cost or can minimize the transaction cost of decision making. 
Stewardship theory suggests motivating managers by offering fulfillment of psychological 
needs (Donaldson, 2008). Donaldson et al., (1997) mentioned that, the behavior of steward 
is collective and this collectivism is beneficial for both insider and outsider of the 
organization. 
 
The reward in the stewardship theory based on intrinsic traits of managers such as how long 
they are dedicated with the achievement of mission statement of the organization. In fact 
there are broad ranges of difference between the agency approach and stewardship 
approaches of corporate control and incentives to managerial behavior.  
 
 
2.2.4 Stakeholder theory 
 
Stakeholder theory is considered as the concurrence of agency theory. Freeman (1984) 
considered as the pioneer of stakeholder theory. He further developed the theory in 1994. 
The separation thesis i.e. discourse of business from discourse of ethics is the major 
principles of stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994). A group of parties that involve with  firm 
directly or indirectly such as creditors, clients, governmental and local community group 
are considered as value creating factor in the governance and hence their participations in 
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the governance is expected in stakeholder theory. Freeman and Mcvea (2001) refers five 
dimensions of stakeholder approach such as single strategic framework, strategic 
management process, survival/organizational objectives achievement, value based 
management and prescriptive process. However it depends on the preference of 
shareholders and stakeholders to choose a best-fit approach for their firm. The firm that 
strives to provide a sustainable value to its different stakeholders is best suited for 
stakeholder governance system in it’s corporate board (Wheeler et al., 2004) 
 
Jenson (2001) found that stakeholder theory of governance maximize the long-term value 
of the firm by combination of structure of stakeholder group in the board and to achieve the 
firms objectives. But it depends on how firm successfully manage its stakeholder value 
process. Carlon et al., (2014) advocates three steps to reap the harvest from stakeholder 
approach such as (a) negotiating identity of the firm (b) Creating value aligning with the 
identity (c) actual realization of the stakeholder value by firm. He also concludes that the 
purpose of corporate governance has been to maximize profits to shareholders perspective 
(Carlon and Downs , 2014). Bridoux et al. (2014) concluded from empirical analysis that 
“stakeholder theory proposes a positive relationship between the fairness towards 
stakeholders and firm performance” . 
Therefore the stakeholder theory can be differentiated from the agency theory in such way 
that it combine all direct and indirect beneficiaries of the firm and capitalize their resources 
through stakeholder approach whereas agency theory only focus on the execution of 
contract between principal and agent. 
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From the above discussion the corporate governance theories can be summarized in the 
following table:  
 
Table 2.2 Summary of corporate governance theories 
 
Theory Name Summary 
Agency theory According to agency theory there is principal-agent 
relationship between owners of the firm and management. 
Owners considered as principal and managers considered as 
agent. Governance structure is a tool to bridge between both 
parties. 
Transaction cost 
economicstheory 
Transaction cost economist theory assume that firms have 
own vision which is more than written in contract between 
owners and professional managers.   
Stewardship theory Stewardship theory suggests keeping trust on mangers as all 
managers are not opportunistic. It reflects the motivational 
spirit of managers.  
Stakeholder theory Stakeholder theory considers a broad range of parties 
involvement in the organization. The related parties interest 
also have to protect through governance structure.  
 
 
2.3 Corporate governance framework 
 
Governance framework depends on several factors. Such as: firm size, firm ownership 
nature, industry expectation, Stakeholder influences and state regulation (Figure 2.1). 
Details of corporate governance framework will be discussed in chapter three.   
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 Firm size can be categorized by sales volume, number of subsidiaries, similarly firm 
ownership nature i.e. family-owned/State-owned. Shareholders dominated firm also have 
impact on governance structure.  Some Industry like financial services are strongly required 
to follow the audit committee independence while manufacturing industry required more 
experts on related sector as an additional qualification for non-executive/independent 
director. Freeman (1984), has mentioned twelve (12) stakeholder groups for large 
organization Moreover, the country specific regulation has also strong influential power in 
governance framework. For example, there required minimum forty percent of each sex in 
the board room of any publicly held companies in Norway (Public Companies Act 2009) 
which quite different from the corporate governance guidelines 2012 in Bangladesh.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 2.1 Factors affecting corporate governance framework 
 
Corporate Governance 
Framework 
 
 
Firm Size 
Firm 
Ownership 
structure 
Industry 
Expectation  
Stakeholder 
Influences 
State 
regulation 
30 
 
2.4 What is financial institutions governance system? 
 
The nature of business and organizational structure of Financial Institution is different from 
the manufacturing or other industries. More complexities than other industries and greater 
government regulation in banking system require special corporate governance practices in 
Banks (Levine, 2004). Macey et al., (2003) argued that directors of depository institutions 
should have legal obligation to consider the impact of their decisions on bank profitability, 
safety and soundness. Therefore the Board of director of the bank has an additional 
responsibility than other organizations.  Bank governance is different from traditional non-
financial governance system because of its Boards system, ownership and control, pay for 
performance, internal controls, reform proposals (Becht et al., 2011). Banks loans and 
deposit contract with the clients are different from other organization (Fama,1985).Severe 
requirements of bank regulation and bank supervision will spilling over from bank 
governance to firm governance (ECGI,2013).Quality information and market disclosure 
can mitigating the fundamental market failures and improving the corporate governance in 
the financial institutions (Mehran et al. 2012).According to Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (ARPA), effective corporate governance in financial institutions 
should have three elements such as: 1) establishing governance arrangements, 2) 
architecture of governance and 3) supervisory review of governance by institutions (ARPA, 
2005). Another distinguish features of financial institution is to manage the tradeoff 
between risk and return.  Although there are well managed risk management oversight 
structure like, risk management committee (RMC), asset liability committee (ALCO), 
business risk committee (BRC) are exists in the banking organizational structure, the role 
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of corporate governance is also play important role in bank risk management. 
Determination of risk appetite should be performed by Board of Directors which is the 
integral parts of choosing business strategies of banks (IFC, 2012). Risk governance and 
risk culture is a integral parts of financial institutions and corporate governance is a key 
cornerstone for risk transformation initiatives (Deloitte , 2016). Another empirical research 
conducted by Adams et al., (2003), has found that there is a systematic difference between 
governance in banking and manufacturing firms.  
 
In the sub-section 2.3 and figure 2.1, we mention and discuss that corporate governance 
framework influenced by firm size, ownership structure, industry expectation, stakeholder 
influences and state regulation. But based on the discussion from this section, it is evident 
that corporate governance in banks is more complex than other industry’s one. Because 
banks are highly leveraged institutions and financial institutions are interrelated with each 
other. Therefore failure of any bank/some major banks might lead to bank run in the market 
and can collapsed whole financial system, which we found in 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Moreover the directors in the financial institutions should have financial literacy and the 
relationship between the principal and agent has more dimensions in banking structure.  For 
example there are rating agencies, central bank, who are playing a critical role in governing 
financial institutions. The bank governance system illustrated in the figure 2.2 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 2.2 Factors affecting corporate governance in banks 
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regulatory policies. Capital ratios, liquidity ratios and interest rate positively related with 
financial institutions profitability (Bourke, 1989). ROA and ROE is widely used for 
measuring the profitability in banking sector and to determine the effect of bank specific 
and macro economic indicator on profitability (Ali et al., 2011). Ali et al. (2011) used ROA 
and ROE as basic ratio to analyses the profitability of Pakistan’s commercial bank on 
economic indicator. Sayilgan & Yildirim, (2009) also take ROA and ROE as a determinate 
to explore the profitability of Turkey commercial bank for the period 2007-2011.  
 
Vighneswara (2013) finds that large banks are able to maintain better asset quality due to 
their efficiency in credit management. He examines the hypothesis over Indian banking 
industry and found significant evidence in favor of the claim. Roman et al. (2012), also 
support the same in their empirical research over commercial banks on European member 
states. Nonperforming loan stagnant the banks’ lending capabilities which ultimately 
lowering banks profitability and performance (Cucinnelli, 2015). According to Zhang et al. 
(2016), while analyzing the panel data of 81 Chinese banks found that NPL ratio can be 
useful indicator for measuring managerial risk taking behavior, design policy goals and 
crafting strategy to closely monitor the bank.   
 
 
 
************************************************************************* 
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Chapter Three - Evolution of Corporate Governance and Japan as a 
                            case analysis 
 
In this chapter the evolution of corporate governance code will be discussed in the first 
section. Typical board roles and structure, appointment procedure and evaluation process 
will be discussed in the second, third and fourth section respectively. In fifth section of this 
chapter, Japanese financial and governance system will be discussed as a case analysis.   
 
 
3.1 Evolution of Corporate Governance Code 
 
Corporate governance code considered as vital parts of governance system of organization. 
Adoption of corporate governance code is considered as regulatory, normative and 
marginally cognitive pressures (Shahin, 2015). “The importance of ethical principles in 
corporate governance is based on the fact that financial innovation sacrifices business ethics 
by taking excessive risk for the sake of huge profits” (Soltani et al., 2015) . The need for 
corporate governance in banking industry seems as urgent after financial crisis 2007. 
Emerging economics should focus more on corporate laws to improve the corporate 
governance before financial supervision (Kim,2016). The evolution of corporate 
governance in United States , United Kingdom and Europe arises from the separation of 
corporate ownership from corporate control which is associated with agency problem 
(Mallin, 2010). Practicing corporate governance code has good impact on firm’s earning as 
well as ensuring transparency in the organization. Empirical research conducted by 
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Geis(2016), Aras (2015), Okaro et al., (2015), Haji (2014), Chen et al., (2014),  support the 
statement.  The table 3.1 shows the countries timelines of adopting corporate governance 
code  
 
Table 3.1 Time line for adopting first corporate governance guidelines 
 
(Source: European Corporate Governance Institute) 
Year 
1992 UK
1993
1994 Canada South Africa 
1995 Australia France
1996 Spain
1997 Japan The 
Netherlands
USA
1998 Belgium Germany India Itlay Thailand
1999 Brazil Greece Hongkong Ireland Mexico Portugal South 
Korea
OECD 
ICGN
Commonwealth
2000 Denmark Indonesia Malaysia Romania The Philippines
2001 China Czech 
Republic
Malta Peru Singapore Sweden Uganda
2002 Austria Cyprus Hungary Kenya Pakistan Poland Russia Solvokia Switzerland Taiwan
2003 Finland Lithunia Oman New Zealand Turkey Ukarine
2004 Argentina Bangaldesh Iceland Norway Slovenia OECD
2005 Jamaica Latvia
2006 Egypt Estonia Lebanon Luxembourg Israel Macedonia Nigeria Sri Lanka Saudi Arabia United 
Nations
2007 Bulgaira Kazakhstan Republic of 
Maldives
United Arab 
Emirates
2008 Albania Morocco Tunisia Qatar Serbia Slovakia
2009 Algeria Georgia
2010 Armenia Bahrain Baltic States Croatia EBRD Ghana Malawi Yemen
2011 Azerbaijan Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Guernsey Guernsey
2012 Bulgaria
2013 Barbados
List of countries : first code of practice
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Asian financial crisis 1997 play an alarming call to the major Asian economics and most 
countries developed corporate governance guidelines, enacted required laws and 
regulations and has tailored their corporate governance code in line with OECD principles.  
 
 
3.2 Board of Directors role and it’s Structure 
 
 
3.2.1 Role of Board: The board has the power to hire and oversee the top management for 
protecting the shareholders interest (Lightly et al., 2015). The role of board of directors in 
the company is to gain a strategic positioning in the competitive market (Nicholic et al., 
2011).  Hanbrick et al., (2015), Aiello et al., (2012), Zhu et al., (2014) has also support the 
board role as an strategic management point of view. The Carver model of policy 
governance is more precisely describe board responsibility as a mechanism for core value 
creation of the firm. The Carver model of governance principles has 10 basic rules 
(Koeing ,2012). According to Epstein and Roy (2006),  the board must achieve three core 
objectives of the firm:  
i) provide superior strategic guidance to the management to ensure company’s 
sustainable growth;  
ii) ensure accountability of the company to all of its stakeholders; 
iii) ensure a high quality executive teams in managing the company.  
(Adapted by Mallin, 2010) 
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Therefore, the board role in the corporate governance is to create value for the firm than 
just mentoring and monitoring the managers’ activities.  
 
3.2.2 Board Model: Board model may differ from countries to countries. Board model can 
be classified in to two broad categories such as unitary and dual board (figure 3.1). Unitary 
board is a single board system comprised with shareholder directors and non-shareholders 
such as executive director, independent director, depositor director and director from others 
stakeholders. In the United States and the UK , Canada and Australia,  most of the 
companies follow the unitary board system. On the other hand, dual board has two layers: 
one is called supervisory board another is executive board. Supervisory board members are 
elected by shareholder and formulate the strategy for business. Executive board members 
comprised with the top management and they run the business. In Europe the dual board 
system is preferred by the corporations.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 : Board model 
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3.2.3 Sub-committees of Board 
In a board there are several sub committees such as executive committee, audit committee, 
remuneration committee, nomination committee, risk committee, ethics committee. The 
members and term of reference (ToR) of each committee are fixed by the board of directors.  
The relationship between board of directors and each committee is shown below in the 
figure 3.2 :  
 
 
 
 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
       
Figure 3.2 : Board of director and its various committees 
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The prime objective of executive committee is to take decision as business and operation 
level. To review the scope and outcome of internal and external audit is the main objectives 
of audit committee. According to The Institute of Internal Auditors (IAA) of United States , 
the responsibility of audit committee includes:  
 
i) Ensure the integrity of the financial statement of the company 
ii) Comply legal and regulatory requirement of the company 
iii) Ensure independent external auditors qualifications and independence  
iv) Ensure a vibrant internal audit function  
(IAA, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
The main responsibility of risk committee is to identify the potential risk arises from 
business operation and to formulate required policies to tackle those risks. In some 
countries like The UK, Australia has nomination committee which role is to pick the 
suitable candidate for director (in case of independent director), prepare succession plan for 
the company and also to evaluate the performance of the sitting board members. 
Remuneration committee works on the term of reference of CEO, CEO’s compensation 
package, executive compensation system and pension system of the company. Ethics 
committee’s objectives are to ensure the stop of breach of perceived good governance, 
shareholders right, fraud and any unethical practices inside the organization.  
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3.3 Background and objectives of Basel regulation  
 
Basel committee was formed in 1974 by governors of G10 countries as a result of financial 
turmoil that occurred in 1973 after breakdown of Bretton Wood System (Basel 2015 b). 
The necessity of introducing a homogeneous capital rule for all internationally active banks 
was raised by the Basel committee in early 1980s, when the Latin American debt crisis hits 
world economy. G10 countries central banks governors were agreed to consider weighted 
approach to measure the banks on and off balance sheet risk (Basel 2015 b).  Basel accord 
was established with two fundamental objectives: 
 
1) to strengthen the soundness and stability of international banking system , and 
2) to bring high degree of consistency to banks in different countries.  
 
Through the accord, it was hoped that banks creditors’ interest would be protected even 
bank fails and it also create disincentives for taking excessive risk by banks. Additionally, 
it removes the inequality arises from differences in capital requirement followed by each 
countries i.e. it create an international level playing field for all internationally active 
banks. In 1988, the first Basel accord I was approved by G10 governors and decided to 
maintain minimum capital ratio 8% (capital to risk weighted assets). In 1993, Basel 
committee has confirmed that all G10 countries implement the Basel-I accord for 
international banking business and later on almost 100 countries have adopted Basel-I 
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within 1998. According to Jacobo (2003), there were three major shortcoming of Basel-I 
accord which includes:  
A) Risk categories and risk weight were not linked with default rate. All assets in 
one category were considered as same risky. 
B)  Flawed risk assessment methodologies which assumes that a portfolio’s total 
risk is equal to the sum of the risks of the individual assets in the portfolio. 
C) It gives preferential treatment to government securities which mean that banks 
need not hold any capital against those securities. 
 
The Asian crisis in 1997-98, Sovereign default of Russia in 1998 has pointed out the 
limitations of Basel-I accord more practically. To respond the limitations of Basel-I accord, 
in 1998 Basel committee issued a new proposal for capital adequacy framework which 
known as Basel II accord. In 2004, the committee has released revised capital framework 
under Basel II accord. In this framework the followings were incorporated 
 
1) Raised the minimum capital from 8 % to 10%  
2) Supervisory review process introduced for which banks have to maintain 
additional capital. 
3) Effective Market disclosure for market discipline and sound banking practices.  
 
However, the Lehman shock in 2008 has again pointed out to strengthen the capital base , 
need to review the Basel II accord and it was found that banking sector’s has taken too 
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much leverage and inadequate liquidity which leads to global financial crisis. In 2010, 
Basel III was set out by Basel committee and G20 leaders have emphasis to introduce Basel 
III in 2013 and fully implemented by 2017 . The major features of Basel III are: 
 
1) Enhance the quality of capital and specify the minimum common equity capital and 
Tier- 1 capital. 
2) Need to maintain 2.5% capital conservation buffers.  
3) Introduce Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to 
combat against liquidity crisis and funding mismatch respectively.  
 
 
3.4 Financial and governance system of Japan as a case analysis 
 
3.4.1. What is financial system: 
Financial system is considered as economic life line of economic growth. De Gregorio & 
Guidotti (1995), Levine & Zervos (1996), Ahmed & Ansari (1998), Adjasi & Biekpe 
(2006), Hassan et al., (2011), Adu et al.,(2013), Nyashaand Nicholas (2016) support the 
statement. According to Berglof (1990), financial systems can be two types such as : 
 
i) Anglo American security based system   
ii) Bank based system.  
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Anglo American security based system mainly concentrates on capital market.  An efficient 
securities market is a prerequisite for this type of financial system. Most of the corporate 
finance is collected from the capital market through issuing stocks, corporate bond, and 
other capital market product. United States financial system is a good example for security 
based banking system.  In contrast, bank based system is focused on credit provides by 
banks to firms for their long term and short term finance. Capital market role is limited in 
this system. Here, banks are closely monitor firms’ activities through its various 
mechanisms. Japanese traditional banking system can be cited for bank based system. 
 
 
3.4.2 Main bank system of Japan : 
 
Main bank system is the unique beauty of Japanese financial system. Three stages 
corporate monitoring system such as ex ante, interim and ex post are delegated to the main 
bank of firm (Aoki, 1994).  Suzuki (2011) states that, to act as financial intermediary, main 
bank system used indirect finance mode for corporate finance, creating incentive for 
monitoring and long run relationship with clients and for financial stability it used three 
mechanism such as protection mechanism, sanction mechanism and sharing information 
with regulators.  Based on Patrick (1983) , Kato (1957) and Teranishi (1990) analysis, Aoki 
(1994), has labeled the evolution of main bank system in to five phases such as  
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i) 1870s-1910s 
ii) 1810s-1927s 
iii) 1927s- 1950s 
iv) 1951s-1975s  (Hey days of main bank system)  
v) 1975-till  
 
 
3.4.3 Impact of Basel accord in Japanese banking system 
 
To comply the Basel-I accord all Japanese banks that having overseas branch were required 
to kept 8% capital ratio, whereas the banks having only domestic branches required to 
maintain 4% capital ratio. All the banks in Japan were given five years to adjust the Basel 
accord that force into effect from 1992. However, implementation of Basel accord in 1992 
has considered as one of the key reason for Japanese prolonged financial stagnant. The 
implementation of Basel accord was a badly planned transition of monitoring framework 
based on Anglo American and Basel model (Suzuki, 2011). Actually implementation of 
Basel accord in Japan was so hurry to respond the international community’s concern 
especially from United States in the name of creating level playing field. As a result the 
domestic banks have to limit their lending and the firms get fewer loans from the banks. 
Ultimately the firms produce less and consumers reduce their consumption and which 
turned into decline of GDP. Peek and Rosengren (1993) found that regulatory enforcement 
actions such as Basel shrinkage the bank loans to the economic sectors. Risk based capital 
45 
 
requirement associated with Japanese stock market decline (Peek and Rosengren (1997).  
Basel-I accord implementation has decline the credit supply in the Japanese market (Honda, 
2002) . Ito and Sasaki (2002) conducted empirical studies on 87 major Japanese banks 
credit behavior from the period 1990-1993 and found that bank with lower capital ratio 
tend to issue subordinate debt and credit growth was curtailed. City banks and trust banks 
lending behavior also affected by Basel accord (Ito and Sasaki, 2002). Horiuchi et al., 
(1998) also conducted empirical studies on major 21 Japanese banks for the period 1990 to 
1996 and conclude that Japanese major banks issued subordinate debt to tackle the Basel 
accord requirement. Montgomery (2005) stated that the Basel accord implementation in 
Japan tends the bank’s portfolio from highly risk weighted assets such as corporate loans 
into un-weighted low return based assets such as government bond.  
Therefore, it is evident that Basel accord implementation in Japan has created some 
problem in the domestic credit market although it brings internationalization of Japanese 
banks. In the next chapter we will discussed this issue in the context of Bangladesh as 
Bangladesh has also implement Basel I and Basel II in 1998 and 2009 respectively.   
 
 
3.4.4 Transformation in the corporate governance of Japan 
 
The main institutional features of corporate governance in Japan can be described in three 
broad pillars such corporate ownership and finance , employment and industrial relation , 
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board of directors (Aoki et al., 2007). The figure 3.4 illustrates the traditional corporate 
governance system in Japan . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Features of Corporate Governance in Japan 
(Source: Adopted from Aoki et al., 2007) 
 
However after the Olympus scandal in 2011, the voice for reform in governance system got 
more popularity and finally Japan introduced new corporate governance code in 2015. 
However the changing process started from the mid-1990s. Box 4.2 shows the milestones 
for legal changes of corporate governance in Japan. 
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Box 3.1 Legal changes in Japanese Corporate governance system 
Year Nature of change Significance 
1993 Commercial code  Induction of outside director has approved 
1994 Commercial code  Remove the prohibition on the purchase of own 
company’s share 
1997 Commercial code Change the share buyback system 
1999 Commercial code Introduce share swap system in inter-company 
2002 Commercial code  Introduce committee system for major corporations.  
2003 Accounting standard Introduce asset-impairment accounting 
2006 Corporate law (Company 
Act)  
Adopted the revised corporate law to bring 
diversification in the governance structure  
2013 National Policy Japan revitalization Strategy adopt by Cabinet 
2014 Corporate governance code Adopt “Japan’s Stewardship code” 
2015 Corporate governance code  
Corporate law (Company 
Act)  
Adopt “Japan’s Corporate Governance  code”  
Adopted revised company act that incorporating the 
new corporate governance system.  
 
The impact of changes in corporate governance has reflected on the ownership structure of 
Tokyo stock exchange securities. A significant change in the institutional investors in 
shareowners and foreigners invest more on the Tokyo stock exchange which reflects that 
the confidence on market has gradually increased over last fifteen years. Figure 3.4  shows 
the percentage of shareowners category form 1970 to 2015. 
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Figure : 3.4 Distribution percentage of market value owned by type of shareholders 
 
 
    %                                                                                                                                      % 
 
 
                            (Source: 2015 Shareowners survey , Tokyo Stock Exchange), 
(http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/markets/statistics-equities/examination/01.html ) 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
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Chapter Four - Overview of Bangladesh Banking Industry, governance 
                           System and Basel  Accord 
 
 
4.1 Overview of Banking Industry in Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh banking industry has restarted in January 1972 just after independence from 
Pakistan in December, 1971. In 1972 all the commercial banks were nationalized to ensure 
the economic development in all regions of the country and to collect the domestic savings 
from rural areas. In 1980s the country has opened the banking industry to private 
entrepreneurs. Some state-owned banks were denationalized and some new banks get 
license to start banking business in this period. Now 39 private commercial banks are 
operated in Bangladesh. Bangladesh bank has classified total banks of the country into two 
broad types; one is scheduled bank, that gets license from the Bangladesh Bank and 
operated under Bank companies act. Another is nonscheduled bank which established 
through special acts to serve some specific purposes. There are 56 scheduled banks and 4 
non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh. Scheduled banks can also be classified into four basic 
categories. Classification of Private commercial banks as per generation wise are shown in 
table 4.1, whereas in figure 4.1 shows the function wise classification of banks in 
Bangladesh.  
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Table 4.1 Generation wise classification of private commercial banks in Bangladesh  
Bank Categories as per generation  Year of operation/ 
denationalization   
Number of banks 
1st generation  1982-1987 9 
2nd generation  1995-1999 18 
3rd generation  2001 3 
4rth generation  2013 9 
Total  39 
 
Figure 4.1 Classification of Banks (function -wise) 
(N= Number of banks) 
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 The performance of the banking industry for the year 2015 is presented in the table 4.2 
 
 
Table 4.2 Bangladesh banking performance (2015) 
Bank types  No. of 
banks  
No. of 
branches 
% of Total 
assets  
% of Total 
deposit  
ROA  
 
ROE 
 
NPL 
ratios  
SCBs 5 3,690 27.5 28.28 -0.6 -13.30 21.9 
DFIs 3 1,406 3.7 2.92 -1.2 -5.8 23.2 
PCBs 39 4,226 63.5 64.44 1.0 10.8 4.8 
FCBs 9 75 5.5 4.36 2.9 15.7 7.8 
Total 56 9,397 100 100 1.27 10.5 8.8 
 
(Source: Bangladesh Bank , 2015) 
 
 
The central bank operated under Bangladesh Bank order 1972 (amended in 2003) and all 
scheduled banks are regulated through banking companies act 1991 (amended in 2013) . 
Various reform projects were implemented to enhance the supervisory and regulatory 
capacity of central bank. Right now two World Bank projects are active in Bangladesh, 
namely “Financial Sector Support Project” and “Modernization of State-owned Financial 
Institutions Project” for strengthening central bank and state-owned commercial banks 
respectively.  On the other hand, the activities of private commercial banks are directly 
monitored and supervised by central bank and all state-owned banks are monitored jointly 
by ministry of finance and central bank. 
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4.2 Overview of Corporate Governance system in banking industry of Bangladesh 
 
 
After capital market collapsed in Bangladesh in 1996, there was massive concern about 
market discipline and the roles of BSEC in the capital market. Several committees were 
formed to investigate the market crash and development of capital market in Bangladesh. It 
was believed that most of the sponsor directors were involved in market manipulation and 
SEC has failed to monitor and control this malpractice. Although the government did not 
disclose the findings to the public, several criminal cases were filed against various 
companies’ directors. Policy reform and formulation can improve the efficiency and 
reliability in the market (Alam et al., 2011). The journey of corporate governance was 
started in early 2000s in Bangladesh. In 2004, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) 
published the governance code. But as this institute has no regulatory authority, there is no 
obligation to the listed companies to comply the BEI code. Subsequently BSEC has issued 
the first governance code in 2006. This was the first step to regularize the listed companies’ 
corporate governance system in “comply or explain basis”. In 2011, unfortunately again 
Dhaka Stock Exchange general index (DGEN) fall sharply to 7118 on January 11, 2011 
from 8912 on December 05, 2010 (figure 4.2) and thousands of investors lost their initial 
investment within one month. After continuous protestation from various stakeholders of 
the market, BSEC again revised the corporate governance code and made it as “comply” 
basis. The evolution of corporate governance in Bangladesh is shown in table 4.3  
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Figure 4.2  Dhaka Stock Exchange general index (DGEN) from 2006-2012 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Timeline of evolution of corporate governance in Bangladesh  
 
1996 First capital market scam in Bangladesh  
2004 BEI first published governance code 
2006 BSEC introduced governance code for all listed companies as “comply or 
explain” basis. 
2010 Bangladesh Bank issued new guidelines for banking company’s board of 
directors and other related governance issues. 
2011 Massive market crash in Dhaka Stock Exchange  
2012 BSEC revised governance code for all listed companies and mentioned it as   
“comply” basis. 
2012 Bangladesh Bank revised the guidelines for board of directors and other 
governance issues.  
2013 Banking companies act 1991 was amended in line with governance code 
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4.3 Corporate Governance framework of banking industry in Bangladesh  
 
All the banking companies in Bangladesh have unitary board and all the private 
commercial banks (except fourth generation banks) are listed in the bourses. Boards of 
directors are elected in the annual general meeting by the shareholders for three years term. 
As the institutional investors are not dominating in banking securities, their representation 
in the board is also very low. In this research we found that average 40% of banking 
companies’ shares is concentrated with sponsor directors (annexure Table A3) and hence it 
is very difficult to elect a director from the general shareholders group. The governance 
practice and decision making procedure are almost same in all private banks. The figure 4.3 
shows the corporate governance structure of the banking industry of Bangladesh.  
 
Figure 4.3 Corporate governance framework of banking industry in Bangladesh 
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It is shown in the figure 4.3 that, the three sub-committees (AC, RMC and EC) and CEO 
are directed by Board of directors. MANCOM consists with top executives of the banks 
which run operational activities and it leads with CEO. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this study that, there are two regulatory bodies such as BSEC and 
Bangladesh Bank for corporate governance issues in banking industry. Therefore, based on 
the corporate governance guidelines (2012), Bank companies act (1991) and other different 
directives issued by BSEC and Bangladesh bank up to November 2016, the key features of 
corporate governance of banking industry of Bangladesh are summarized in the table 4.3.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Key features of corporate governance in the banking industry of Bangladesh. 
 
Sl. no Governance attributes Benchmark 
1 Board’s size 5-20 
2 Minimum shareholding required to be an 
director 
2% 
3 Maximum number of director from a family  02 
4 Number of independent directors (ID) At least 20%  of  board size 
5 Tenure for director Can be consecutive for 2 terms (3 
years each term)  
6 Number of  board’s sub-committee allowed  3 (AC, RMC, EC) 
7 Maximum member in Audit Committee 
(AC) 
5 
(at least 2 ID and the chairman of 
AC must be an ID ) 
8 CEO duality Not allowed 
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9 CEO bonus Cash (maximum 1 million BDT), 
no stock options will be allowed. 
10 Termination of director and CEO   Executed by Central bank , if 
deemed necessary  
11 Disclosure of compliance  Mandatory in the annual report. 
12 Compliance certificate of corporate 
governance 
Mandatory by professional 
Secretaries/Accountants 
 
 
4.4 Implementation of Basel accord in Bangladesh: 
 
The financial system in Bangladesh is bank based and its capital market is not well 
developed. Hence indirect finance mode is dominated for corporate finance and the banks 
have collected the household savings through countrywide branch network. In 1996, Basel 
accord was first introduced in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank, 2002). Bangladesh bank has 
increased the capital adequacy ratio requirement from 8% to 9% in the year 2003. In 2005, 
the country has started its journey towards Basel II and from January 2010 it fully 
implemented the Basel II accord. Subsequently in 2015 it started the implementation of 
Basel III accord and full implementation of Basel III is scheduled to be completed on 
January 2019. Bangladesh banking industry uses standardized approach to compute the risk 
weighted assets .There is few empirical research were conducted on Basel implementation 
effect in Bangladesh. Kabir (2009) found that the risk taking behavior of banks in South 
Asian countries were constrained by Basel accord. Ahmed et al., (2015) conducted research 
for five years data (2008-2012) on 25 commercial banks in Bangladesh and found that 
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capital adequacy ratios have positive impact on bank profitability. However the small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) in Bangladesh have a negative impact on Basel accord. As 
SMEs portfolio is high risk weighted, banks have less intent to finance in SMEs. But 
country’s Small and Medium enterprises contributes about to 40% of manufacturing output 
of the country and 25% to national GDP and about 70-80% of non –agricultural work 
forces  are engaged in 7.2 million firms in 2013 (ADB, 2014). Existing credit rating system 
in Bangladesh also hinders SMEs to get bank loan (Chowdhury et al., 2013). SME finance 
may massively affected by strict lending requirement (ESBG, 2014). High cost of finance is 
a constraint for Bangladesh to gear up growth and SME access to credit is still limited 
(ADB, 2016). There are eight different refinance scheme facilities were implemented for 
banks and NBFIs by BB and different development partners (DP) in recent years 
(Bangladesh Bank 2014-15). The refinance scheme has subsidized all commercial banks 
SME portfolios which presented in the table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: SME refinance schemes for bank in Bangladesh 
 
(Source: ADB, 2014) 
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The impact of Basel transition on Japan’s national economy has already discussed in 
chapter three of this research and it was found that Basel accord hindered Japan’s growth. 
From the above Bangladesh context analysis, we can conclude that although Basel accord 
brings financial stability in the banking industry of Bangladesh but it hinders the SME 
growth in Bangladesh to some extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
************************************************************************* 
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
 
5.1 Research Approach  
 
The purpose of the research is to identify the relationship between the corporate governance 
and commercial bank performance. The purpose of the study is also to analysis the 
corporate governance guidelines 2012 that is effective now in Bangladesh. To obtain a true 
picture of the banking sector performance, we consider Return on Assets (ROA), Return on 
Equity (ROE), Non- performing loan (NPL), and Cost of fund (COF) as performance 
measurement yardstick. On the other hand this research consider some key parameters from 
the corporate governance guideline such as the number of board members, audit committee 
size, the ratio of independent directors in both board and audit committee . Bangladesh is a 
developing country and its economy mainly based on readymade garments (RMG) and 
remittance from Non- resident Bangladeshi (NRB). Therefore, we consider five well 
recognized economic indicators like consumer price index (CPI), broad money growth rate , 
risk premium on lending rate, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate and personal 
remittance on GDP in the regression line to check the model’s viability in economic 
fluctuation of the country. In this research we conducted quantitative analysis of the sample 
data and while interpreting the result of the analysis we use traditional statistical 
interpretation.  
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5.2 Data set and sample size  
 
The data relevant to performance yardstick and corporate governance variables are taken 
from the annual reports from the year 2010 to 2015. Disclosure of corporate governance 
compliance and the key financial ratios in annual report are mandatory for all banking 
companies in Bangladesh and those must be certified by Professional Chartered Secretaries 
and Professional Accountants respectively. Therefore the information is duly certified and 
authenticated. There are 39 private commercial banks operated in Bangladesh. Out of them 
nine (09) banks has started its operation in 2013. As we consider the data base of the 
sample banks for the year 2010 to 2015, hence, these nine banks are excluded from the 
sample size. Total 21 banks data are included in the sample size which is shown in the table 
5.1. The final sample set consists of 126 observations for 21 banks over six years.  All the 
economic indicators dataset of Bangladesh economy was retrieved from the World Bank 
data base (http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh). 
 
Table 5.1 Population and sample size distribution 
 
Bank Categories as 
per generation  
Population Sample 
size 
Sample represents 
the % of population   
% of total 
sample    
1st generation 9 6 66% 28.57% 
2nd generation 18 12 66% 57.15% 
3rd generation 3 3 100% 14.28% 
4rth generation * 9 - - - 
Total 39 21 54% 100% 
                            *4rth generation banks have started its operation at the end of 2013 
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5.3 Definition of Variables: 
 
The dependent and independent variables used in this research are largely recognized by 
contemporary literatures. This will helps to understand the prior empirical research findings 
and this research findings as well. In this study four variables are considered as dependent 
variables (i.e. return on assets, return on equity, percentage of nonperforming loans to total 
loans and cost of fund) whereas the independent variables includes board size, audit 
committee size, ratio of independent director to total board size, ratio of independent 
director to audit committee size, percentage of sponsor directors shareholding to total 
shareholding position of the bank, CPI, broad money growth rate, risk premium for lending , 
GDP growth rate and the percentage of personal remittance on country’s GDP . We do not 
consider any control variables in the model as every bank have to follow the corporate 
governance guidelines and the sample banks have similarities in size of assets and age of 
maturity. Definition of the variables are listed in the table 5.2 
 
Table 5.2 Definition of variables 
 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables :  
Return on Assets  (ROAit ) Ratio of net profit after tax to total asset . 
Return on Equity (ROEit ) Ratio of net profit after tax to total equity capital. 
Ratio of NPL loan to total loan 
(NPLit ) 
Percentage of nonperforming loan to total loan and 
advances  
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Cost of fund (COFit )  Ratio of total cost of deposit (including 
administrative expenses) to total weighted average 
deposit* 
Independent variables:  
Board Size(BSit ) Log of bank’s board size. Board size determines the 
number of directors in bank’s board.  
Audit committee size (ASit ) Log of bank’s audit committee size. Audit committee 
size determines the number of member in bank’s 
audit committee. 
Ratio of independent director 
on the board(IBit ) 
A percentage of independent director to total number 
of directors in the board 
Ratio of independent director 
on audit committee(IAit ) 
A percentage of independent director to total number 
of directors in the audit committee 
Ratio of sponsor director 
shareholdings in the bank(SSit ) 
Ratio of share owned by sponsor director to total 
outstanding common stocks.  
Consumer price index (CPIit ) CPI refers the price level change in consumers good 
and services consumed by household and it reflects  
the inflation or deflation effects on goods and 
services  
Broad money growth rate 
(BMit ) 
Money supply (M2, M3, M4) growth rate in the 
economy  
Risk premium on lending rate The interest rate that obtains after deducting the 
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(RPit ) treasury bills rate from lending rate.  
Growth rate of gross domestic 
product  (GDPit ) 
Annual growth rate of GDP of the country  
Percentage of personal 
remittance on GDP (PRit ) 
Proportion of Personal remittance received on GDP 
 
* While computation of cost of fund banks have to follow the guidelines of 
Bangladesh Bank. According to BB guideline “cost of deposit” include the interest 
rate of deposit, administrative cost, cost of capital whereas the “total weighted 
average deposit” computed after assigning the weight on each deposit product as 
per maturity.   
 
 
5.4 Research model 
 
This research use panel data methodology because of sample contains data of various banks 
and over a period of time. Panel data is helpful to identify the effects of differences and 
dynamics of individual variables than cross sectional time series data (Hisao, 2007). The 
core regression model is specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  + 𝑥𝑖𝑡   + 
𝑖𝑡  
 
Where,  i=1,……126,t=1,……6 
where i denotes the cross-section dimension and t indicates the time dimension,Yit  is the 
firm i’s performance measures at time t, xit  is a 1 x K vector of observations on K, 
 is a K 
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x 1 vector of parameters explanatory variables for the ith firm in the tth period, it  is a 
disturbance term and is defined as 

it =

i  +Vt   
Where  i  denotes the unobservable individual effect and Vt  denotes the remainder 
disturbance.  
Pooled least square method was used to estimate the coefficients. The following four 
regression models were developed to analyze the effects of corporate governance attributes 
on the bank performance. 
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Where  
ROAit = Return on assets of bank i at time t,  
ROEit = Return on equity of bank i at time t,  
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NPLit = Percentage of nonperforming loan to total loan and advances of bank iat time t,  
COFit = Ratio of total cost of deposit (including administrative expenses) to total 
weighted Average deposit of bank i at time t,  
BSit = Board size of bank i at time t,  
ASit = Audit committee size of bank i at time t,  
IBit = Ratio of independent director to board size of bank i at time t,  
IAit = Ratio of independent director to audit committee size of bank i at time t,  
SSit = Sponsor director shareholding ratio of bank i at time t, 
CPIit = Consumer price index of the country for bank i at time t, 
BMit = Broad money growth rate of the country for bank i at  time t, 
RPit = Risk premium on lending rate of the country for bank i at  time t, 
GDPit = GDP growth rate of the country for bank i at  time t, 
PRit = Personal remittance as percentage of GDP of the country for bank i at  time t, 

1
− 
10
= coefficients of the related variables, 

𝑖𝑡  
= error term of firm i at time t. 
 
 
 
*************************************************************************  
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Chapter Six: Analysis of empirical results 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables used in this study are 
shown in appendix table A1. In the descriptive statistics it is shown that the mean of return 
on assets, return on equity, nonperforming loan and cost of fund are 1.38%, 14.63%, 4.29% 
and 9.15% respectively. These mean of the ratios indicate that the banking sector 
performance is not so promising in the observed period. The ROA and ROE are decreased 
in 2013-2015 comparing to 2010-2012 and NPL has increased during the same period. In 
2010-2012 the mean of ROA, ROE and NPL were 1.70, 17.30 and 3.51 respectively 
whereas in 2013-2015 it stood at 1.06, 11.96 and 5.08 respectively (Table A3) . This refers 
that the performance of the banks went down after code adopted in 2012.  
The mean of independent directors on the board size is 14.75%. According to corporate 
governance guidelines-2012, the requirement for appointment of independent director is 
minimum one-fifth to total board size. This requirement was not obligatory for the year 
2010 - 2011.  As this research dataset included the year 2010 and 2011, the mean ratio of 
independent directors to total board size was shown as 14.75% which shows that less than 
minimum 20%. On the other hand, the ratio of independent directors in the audit committee 
is 32.38% which reflects that audit committee has a good composition with independent 
directors. The mean ratios of Sponsor directors shareholding in the bank is 40.12% which 
indicates that sponsors directors have strong voting power in the annual general meeting as 
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well as in the board room. This also indicate that although independent directors ratio were 
raised in the year 2013-2015 but the shares held by sponsor directors remain almost same in 
the same period.  
Besides, the mean of broad money growth rate, GDP growth rate, risk premium on lending, 
CPI and personal remittance on GDP for the period 2010-2015 are 16.72%, 6.19%, 6.15%, 
122.27 and  9.19% respectively (Table A1). The trend of mean of the economic indicators 
before and after  adoption of  governance  code also hints that the economic trend were not 
well performing. The average of CPI, BM and PR during the period 2010-2012 were 
109.43, 18.33, 9.79 respectively whereas in 2013-2015 those stood as 135.13, 15.12 and 
8.60 respectively. Moreover if we follow the trend of GDP growth rate and risk premium 
on lending during the period 2012-2014 then it observed that the situation becoming 
worsened and the trend showed negative performance. This trend also reflected in the 
regression result that will be discussed in the subsection 6.3 
 
 
6.2 Correlations of variables 
 
Result of Pearson correlation coefficient is presented in the appendix table A2. It is 
observed from the table that the cross correlation terms for the dependent variables are 
relatively small and thus there is no more concern for multi co-linearity among the 
dependent variables. 
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6.3 Regression Results 
 
This research has developed four regression models to analyze the effect of corporate 
governance attributes on bank performance. The detailed of empirical results are provided 
in the appendix A4, A5, A6 and A7. While regression analysis we use fixed-effect model to 
interpret the result. Because while run the random–effect model, we found that, the Wald 
chi2 >0.05 in all regression model and the Hausman test also reject the null hypothesis to 
accept the random-effect model. In the fixed-effect model the probability of f test (prob.>F) 
of all regression models are less than .005 (<0.05) which validate the model acceptability. It 
also refers that, all coefficient in this models are different than zero which can able to 
explain the variation of the variables in the model.  
 
The result reported in the table A4 shows that all the independent variables are related with 
return on assets. All the attributes of corporate governance such as board size, audit 
committee size, the ratio of independent directors to board size, the ratio of independent 
directors to audit committee and sponsor directors shareholding ratio are positively 
correlated and statistically significant with return on assets. On the other hand, CPI, risk 
premium and GDP growth rate are negatively co-related with ROA and also this 
relationship is statistically significant. Broad money growth rate and personal remittance on 
GDP are positively and negatively respectively with ROA but are not statistically 
significant. 
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The result presented in the table A5 indicates that board size and audit committee size are  
positively related with return on equity but statistically insignificant. Ratio of independent 
director ratio to board size and independent director ratio on audit committee size are 
negatively related with return on equity and both are statistically significant. Sponsor 
directors shareholding ratio is negatively related with return on equity but statistically 
insignificant. Although economic indicators show both positive and negative relationship 
with ROE but none of them are statistically significant.  
 
In the table A6, the reported result shows that Board size and Audit committee size are 
correlated negatively and positively respectively with ratio of nonperforming loans (NPL) 
and both are statistically significant. On the other hand ratio of independent director to 
board size, is negatively correlated but statistically insignificant and ratio of independent 
director to audit committee size is positively correlated and statistically significant. Finally 
sponsor directors shareholding ratio is positively related with return on equity and 
statistically significant. Among the economic indicators: CPI, broad money growth rate and 
personal remittance percentage of GDP are positively related with NPL but statistically 
insignificant. Risk premium and GDP growth rate are negatively correlated with NPL 
whereas the former one is statistically significant and later in not. 
 
Finally, the result presented in the table A7 indicates that, the relationship with the all the 
attributes of corporate governance and cost of fund are statistically significant. Board size, 
Independent director ratio on audit committee size and sponsor directors shareholding ratio 
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are negatively related with cost of fund. Besides, audit committee size and ratio of 
independent director to board size are positively related with cost of fund. On the other 
hand CPI, risk premium on lending and percentage of personal remittance are positively 
related with cost of fund but only CPI is statistically significant. Broad money growth and 
GDP growth are negatively correlated and both are statistically insignificant. 
The summary of the relationship between corporate governance attributes, economic 
indicators and performance measurement variables are presented in the table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Summary of relationship between corporate governance attributes 
economic indicators and performance measure variables 
 
 
Variable 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭  𝐑𝐎𝐄𝐢𝐭  𝐍𝐏𝐋𝐢𝐭  𝐂𝐎𝐅𝐢𝐭  
BSit  Positive Positive Negative* Positive 
ASit  Negative** Negative** Positive Positive** 
IBit  Negative** Negative** Positive** Negative 
IAit  Negative** Negative** Positive** Negative 
SSit  Positive Positive* Positive Positive 
CPIit  Negative** Negative** Positive** Negative 
BMit  Positive** Positive** Negative** Negative 
RPit  Positive** Positive** Negative** Negative* 
GDPit  Negative** Negative** Positive* Positive* 
PRit  Positive Positive Negative Positive** 
 
 
**= Significant at 1% level, *= significant at 5% level  
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6.4 Discussion on empirical findings 
 
The coefficient of board size is positively related with return on assets, return on equity and 
negatively related with nonperforming loan ratio. This relationship indicates that the 
broader size of board can contribute more effectively to the board decision and ultimately 
enhance the company’s ROE and ROA. It also indicates that broader board size enhances 
the shareholders’ value.  Earlier empirical studies such as Isik (2016), Hsu (2016), Adams 
et al. (2012), Dalton et al. (1998) also support this findings and they argue that resource 
dependency theory exists behind this positive relationship. But some studies such as 
Fukomoto et al. (2013), Vo (2013) find negative relationship with board size and firm 
performance. Behavioral theory of firm was the main arguments in favor of their research. 
To sum up, this relationship depends on the firm size, age, nature and expertise of board 
members. However, our study finds that the larger board size has positive correlation with 
cost of fund i.e. the cost of fund increases when the firms maintain a large board. Lee et al., 
(2016) refer such cost as “social cost of firms” whereas Uwuigbe et.al. (2012), finds that in 
large board some members are free ride. Moreover sometimes in a large board, some board 
members are biased by the opinions of a group of members while decision making process 
which increase the overall firm’s expenditure.   
 
The research shows that the coefficient of audit committee size has negative relationship 
with return on assets and return on equity and positive relationship with nonperforming 
loans and cost of fund. It indicates that the audit committee size has played an ineffective 
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role in the bank or audit committee cannot play a fair role in improving firm’s performance. 
Husam et al., (2011), Yahya et al. (2012), Ebrahim (2014) supports our findings. While 
analyzing the biography that disclosed in the bank’s annual report, it is found that some of 
the audit committees’ members have no financial literacy and some are bureaucrat. These 
empirical researches finds that the quality of audit committee is the chief factor rather than 
its size while considering audit committee as a performance enhancing tolls for the firm.  
 
Interestingly, the ratio of Independent director to board size and to audit committee size has 
shown negative correlation with performance variables of bank. The Table A3 shows that 
the ratio of independent directors both to board size and audit committee size has increased 
during the period 2013 to 2015. But the sponsor directors shareholding percentage almost 
same (only 0.07% decreased) during the period 2010-2012 and 2013-2015 (Table A3) .This 
indicates that although the independent directors ratio has increased during the period 
2013-2015, the control of ownership within sponsor directors has remain unchanged during 
the same period. This refers that the control of board still in same groups and independent 
directors has less power in strategic decision making although their representation in board 
has increased during 2013-2015.This findings consistent with previous studies such as 
Kallamu (2016), where he finds that,37 Malaysian finance companies performance has 
negatively related with independent directors ratio during the period 2007-2011 and 
conclude that the strength of independent directors depends on ownership structure of the 
firm . Chen et al. (2015), conducted research on 1,241 Chinese firms performance for the 
period of 2003-2008 and within this period he found that the independence of board on firm 
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performance has increased as the ownership concentration was decline during the period. 
Leung et al. (2014) stated that the effectiveness of independent directors depend on 
ownership pattern of the firm while analyzing 170 firms of Honk Kong Stock Exchange.  
Lin et al., (2012) found that independent directors cannot enhance performance or 
monitoring function due to small representation on board comparing to controlling 
shareholders representation. To sum up, it is evident from the previous empirical research 
that , the role of independent directors has largely influenced by firm’s ownership structure. 
 
The coefficient of sponsor directors shareholding with all performance variables are 
positively significant. This findings have two major significance:  firstly, return on assets 
and return on equity are increased when the sponsor directors shareholding is increased 
which is good for firm’s financial health, another is, the nonperforming loan and cost of 
fund also increase while sponsor directors shareholding increased which has long term 
negative effect on firm and turn the banks vulnerable to new investment. Hanafi et 
al.,(2013) found that ownership concentration in bank can positively related with ROA and 
bank risk whereas La porta et al. (1999, 2000)found that the ownership concentration in the 
firm protect the investors’ interest. On the other hand, Rim et al., (2015) found that the 
ownership concentration in bank may lead to credit misallocation. Wang (2015) found that 
the relationship between the ownership concentration and performance across the 
developing countries are negatively correlated. Parichat et al., (2011) found that ownership 
concentration deteriorates the assets quality of bank and increase the overall operating cost. 
To sum up we might conclude that the sponsor shareholder concentration in the bank 
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increase the investors return to some extent but the assets quality may be deteriorated   in 
long term.  
 
In this regression model, we consider five economic indicators that are surrounding the 
bank performance environment. It helps to test the viability of this model to what extent it 
works under different economic environment. In table A2 it is observed that consumer 
price index (CPI) has negatively correlated with ROA, ROE and COF whereas it is 
positively related with NPL. Previous study also supports this result. Chioma et al. (2015) 
has conducted research on 18 Nigerian commercial bank for the period of 2000-2014 and 
find that there is significant negative correlation with bank performance and inflation. They 
(Chioma et al., 2015) suggest that government should control money circulation to control 
inflation which needed to fine tuned of banking growth. The empirical research conducted 
by Boyd et al., (2000) over 97 countries from the period 1960-1995 of banking sector 
development and impact of inflation and claims that increase in inflation can intensify 
information asymmetries in the financial sector which distorts the bank performance.  
Broad money growth rate, risk premium on lending and personal remittance has positive 
correlation with ROA, ROE and negative relation with NPL. Besides, regarding COF there 
is negative, negative and positive correlation with broad money, risk premium and 
remittance respectively. Although those relationships are not significant yet they have some 
indications. This relationship indicates that banking sector performance can be boost up by 
enhancing circulation of money, raising the lending rate and also by individual foreign 
remittance send by non- resident nationals. The reason may be bank could efficiently 
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maximize its profitability in a speedy money circulation environment and by maximum 
utilization of the wage earners cost free deposit. Rukka (2015) finds while empirical 
analysis of the impact of monetary policy of The People’s Bank of China for the period 
1998-2014 that, the money supply instrument play significant positive role in economic 
development of China. Badarudin et al.,(2011) also find significant relationship with 
money supply and bank stock return while analyzing data of G-7 countries and refer that 
Post Keynesian or PK theory of endogenous money supply can be useful to explain the 
effect.  Fayman and Ling (2011) have found positive correlation with commercial bank 
performance and prepayment of risk premium while analyzing US commercial banks data 
for the period of 1976-2006. He concludes that prepayment of risk increase the ability of 
US commercial banks performance metrics such as ROE, return on loans and liquid ratio. 
Brown and Fabrizio (2015) claims that remittance extend bank credit worthiness and 
ultimately have positive impact on GDP. Their research covers almost 139 countries data 
for 39 years and revealed that remittance inflows into banking channel increasing the 
bank’s capacity to mobilize and lend funds. However, the regression result shows that there 
is negative relationship (although statistically insignificant) with GDP growth rate and bank 
performance indicators like ROE and ROA where as NPL and cost of fund have positive 
relationship with GDP. Apparently it mean that while GDP has increases, bank overall 
performance has went into decline. If we look at the table A3 , it is visible that the average 
GDP growth in 2010-2012 and 2013-2015 was 6.18 and 6.21 respectively which refer that 
GDP growth rate slightly increased before and after adopting the governance code whereas 
the ROE , ROA and NPL were became worsen in 2013-2015 comparing to 2010-2012. 
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This trend reflects in the regression result. Although there is no direct explanation for 
negative relationship, maybe there are other factors such as increase in banks cost due to 
stiff competition among banks, central bank regulation for loan rescheduling contributed 
for deteriorating the bank profitability during the period 2013-2015. It is mentionable here 
that  in 2013 there are new 9 banks have started their operation and central bank has issued 
new master circular for loan rescheduling which tightening the provision requirement and 
as a result banks show less profit in their balance sheet. Tan et al., (2012) also found similar 
findings in empirical research that higher GDP growth leads to lower bank profitability in 
China during the period 2003-2009. His argument was banks have to pay higher rate of tax 
in China which lowering the bank’s profitability and lower taxation and higher cost 
efficiency tend to have higher profitability in Chinese Banks. The financial institutions in 
Bangladesh also had to pay high tax rate (42.5% corporate tax) during the period 2013-
2015.  
 
In fact the core limitation of this regression is that using shorter time series of data in the 
research. For example, we use only six years economic indicators data in the dataset which 
is absolutely insufficient to judge the economic indicators impact on banking sector 
performance. But as corporate governance practices have just started from 2010, we have 
no previous complete data for corporate governance attribute by which we can judge the 
corporate governance guideline. For this limitation, it is quite difficult to reach in a 
complete the interpretation with this regression model.  But this limitation can be overcome 
if we consider only bank performance and economic indicator in the regression line. 
************************************************************************* 
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Chapter Seven: Discussion on research questions and recommendation 
 
 
In this chapter we will discuss about the research questions in first two sections and based 
on the literature review ,empirical findings and discussion  of research question , we place 
some recommendations in the final section.  
 
7.1 Research question #1 
 
In this study, the first research question was to identify the critical factors of the corporate 
governance guidelines of Bangladesh. We briefly discussed about the corporate governance 
guidelines of Bangladesh in chapter four. It is vivid while discussion in the chapter four 
that, the corporate governance code is developed in line with the OECD guidelines and the 
consultation with development partners like World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank. 
While analyzing the guidelines, this research found the following core attributes in the 
corporate governance code of Bangladesh: 
i) Specify the  number of independent directors in the board (one-fifth of total 
board for banking companies)   
ii) Restriction of CEO duality for all listed companies to avoid conflict of interest.  
iii) Fixation of CEO bonus to avoid the “opportunistic behavior” of manager.  
iv) Bangladesh Bank specify the duties and responsibilities of board of directors 
which was not precisely described  before 2006. 
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v) Bangladesh bank also fixed the directors remuneration for banking companies.  
vi) Specify the CEO and CFO responsibility in the governance framework. 
vii) Mandatory disclosure on corporate governance compliance in company’s 
annual report. 
viii)  Minimum 30% shareholding by Sponsor directors and mandatory of 2% 
shareholding to become director of listed companies. 
 
However, the research also found that there are some key factors that are consider as bench 
mark for corporate governance , which are still absent in the guidelines,  such as  
 
i) The role of institutional investors in board. 
ii) Different subcommittee such as remuneration committee,  nomination 
committee of  board. 
iii) There is no penalty will be impose for non-compliance of the governance  
code.  
 
 
7.2 Research question #2 
 
To resolve the second research question, this research attempts to analyze the empirical 
data analysis, which is discussed in the chapter five and six. It is a fact that, corporate 
governance code introduced in Bangladesh just a decade ago. However, we can say that the 
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revised corporate governance guideline (that comes into effect from January 2013), brings 
some structural change in banking companies.  
 
The regression result of this research shows that the board size has a significant impact on 
bank performance (ROA, NPL, COF). However, the table A3 shows that the board size 
became smaller in 2013-2015 (1.09) comparing to 2010-2012 (1.13). Additionally, 
independent directors in the board show significant impact on bank performance.  
 
Regarding the impact of board size we may explain the facts in different way. It is 
mentioned earlier that the code adopted during the period 2013-2015 and the board size 
was not expanded rather slightly shortened during the same period. The number of 
independent directors in the board has increased more than 2.5 times (8.19 to 21.22) during 
the period 2013-2015 comparing to 2010-2012. Most importantly, a good number of 
financial experts and various professionals were appointed in different banks board as 
independent director. Hence to reach a concrete interpretation, the qualitative factors of 
independent directors  might be explained to further expansion of regression result. To do 
so, further qualitative research is required to judge the independent directors professional 
expertise and intellectual capabilities. But it takes a bit longer time series data. Hence it is 
too early to justify the impact of board size (as a corporate governance attribute) on bank 
performance. 
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Regarding the role of independent directors, it is observed that, they were appointed when 
the code adopted in 2013-2015 by keeping the board size unchanged. Therefore, when the 
independent directors were appointed, the number of shareholder directors has reduced but 
the sponsor directors’ shareholding position almost unchanged. On the contrary, the 
performance indicators of the banking industry like ROA, ROE, NPL are further 
deteriorating during the period  2013-2015 (Table A3). Three core points can be raised 
from this scenario: firstly, the independent directors were appointed in large quantity in this 
period, secondly, the control of sponsor directors shareholding in the banks were remain 
almost unchanged before and after adoption of corporate governance code and finally, the 
bank performance was not rosy during this time. From this situation analysis we may say 
that if corporate governance code were not adopted and independent directors were not so 
largely inducted in the board during the period 2013-2015 , bank performance might be 
more worse. Hence we can say that independent directors play a positive role in the 
banking industry by stopping further deteriorating of industry performance. Again we can 
say that it is a limitation of this study that, there is no such qualitative variables are 
included in the regression to justify the independent directors’ capabilities.   
 
From the above analysis we can say that there is a moderate contribution of corporate 
governance in the bank performance in Bangladesh. Yet there is scope for further research 
in corporate governance attributes and bank performance in Bangladesh. 
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7.3 Recommendation 
 
Based on the above discussion in the sub-section 7.1. and 7.2 of this chapter, theoretical 
analysis of corporate governance in this study, considering the history of Bangladesh 
banking industry and empirical findings from this study, this research has the following 
recommendations for enhancing the quality of corporate governance in Bangladesh banking 
industry: 
 
Recommendation for governance system of Bangladesh banking industry. 
i) A clause might be added that, fifty percent (50%) of independent directors will 
appointed by the central bank and rest are appointed by the shareholders in the 
annual general meeting (AGM) or alternatively, central bank and Bangladesh 
Securities of Exchange Commission could jointly establish a pool of independent 
director from where the banks can pick suitable independent directors for their 
board. Hopefully this will ensure the check and balance in appointment of 
independent directors. 
 
ii) Different sub-committees of board such as remuneration committee, ethics 
committee and nomination committee may be included in the corporate governance 
guidelines to bring transparencies in board activities. 
 
iii) The role and responsibilities of CEO in the board is unclear in the existing 
corporate governance guidelines. Therefore, there should be some specific clause 
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such as CEO’s performance evaluation methodology, the maximum limit of CEO’s 
compensation, the ethical ground for termination of CEO could be incorporated in 
the existing guidelines.    
iv) There is no clause in the corporate governance code for appointment of female 
director in the board. But banks are financing to the Women entrepreneurs as well.  
Therefore, at least one female director should be on bank board.    
 
v) Finally Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission and Bangladesh Bank 
can jointly impose some financial and non-financial penalties for non-compliance 
of corporate governance code to establish discipline in the market.   
 
 
 
******************************************************************  
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Conclusion and scope for further research 
 
 
Research on relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is continuing 
in different countries.  There is no clear cut economic theory to explain the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. This research attempted to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance attributes and banks performance 
to explore the effectiveness of corporate governance in banking industry of Bangladesh. In 
this research, we conducted a comprehensive study on corporate governance and bank 
performance for the period 2010-2015.  
 
One notable findings of this study is that board size is significantly related with bank 
performance. It is observed from the empirical study that the relationship between board 
size and bank performance has significantly positive. One of the reason behind this may be 
resource dependency theory exists in this relationship. Resource dependency theory refers 
that the network governance system can reduce the transaction cost of the firm and board of 
director act as an agent to connect the firm internal competences with external environment 
of the firm. As independent directors were appointed by largely in the board during code 
adoption period, we can say that they might bring diverse expertise and experience which 
contribute the board positively. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Donaldson and Davis (1991), 
Williamson (1985) has support this statement. Young (2009) in his thesis found that 
diversified board has the power of collectiveness in strategy formulation and decision 
making. However, further research is required to explain this issue more elaborately. 
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Another finding is that independent director has a relation with bank performance. While 
adopting the governance code, independent directors were just replace the shareholder 
directors in proportionate rate i.e. the banks were not enlarge their board size rather added 
the independent directors by cut off the existing shareholder directors. But the ownership 
control (40%) by sponsor directors was almost same before and after adoption of code. 
Hence the argument in favor of the claim is that if independent directors were not 
appointed largely in the board, the bank performance might be severely deteriorated as the 
percentage of ownership were not changed during the code adoption period (2013-2015). 
Previous research such as Wang et al., (2015) in his empirical research claims that industry 
expert independent directors have ability to perform their monitoring function effectively. 
 
In fact, there are scopes for further research that strengthen the corporate governance 
framework in Bangladesh such as explore the effectiveness of independent directors 
through qualitative research, comparing the effectiveness of independent directors between 
state-owned banks and private commercial banks and comparing the board size between 
state-owned bank and private commercial banks might help to reform the governance code. 
Moreover, the term of reference (ToR) of independent directors in the banking industry of 
Bangladesh should be reconsidered as ownership of the firms control by the sponsor 
directors.  
 
 To recapitulate we can say that, the introduction of corporate governance code in 
Bangladesh just passed over one decade and the country’s banking industry is promising 
and growing. Therefore,  this research work can be consider as ground work for further 
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research to ensure  good governance system in the banking industry as well as other listed 
firms in the stock exchanges.  
 
 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
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Appendix- A 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Div. Minimum Maximum 
ROAit  126 0.013841 0.0067304 0.0035 0.0363 
ROEit  126 0.146339 0.0656092 0.0096 0.3622 
NPLit  126 0.042959 0.0179653 0.009453 0.0973 
COFit  126 0.09149 0.0177366 0.0414 0.1367 
BSit  126 1.108886 0.1535498 0.69897 1.39794 
ASit  126 0.613323 0.1023215 0.30103 0.7781513 
IBit  126 0.1471516 0.1185956 0 60 
IAit  126 0.3238095 0.1963153 0 75 
SSit  126 0.401246 0.1694439 0.0837 0.87 
CPIit  126 1.222783 0.147543 1 1.4366 
BMit  126 0.16725 0.021347 0.1485 0.2107 
RPit  126 0.061583 0.020029 0.0317 0.0944 
GDPit  126 0.06195 0.003538 0.0557 0.0655 
PRit  126 0.09195 0.008232 0.0788 0.1059 
 
Table A2 Pearson correlation coefficient 
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Table A3 Year wise mean of variables:  
 
 
Table A4: The effect of independent /explanatory variables on dependent variable  
                  Return on Assets (𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭 ) 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 95) =     3.65              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .43118465   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00371702
     sigma_u    .00323624
                                                                              
       _cons     .0575233    .043677     1.32   0.191    -.0291866    .1442332
          PR    -.3594674   .2098893    -1.71   0.090    -.7761503    .0572156
         GDP    -.0505939   .1800886    -0.28   0.779    -.4081149    .3069272
          RP    -.0052197   .0602513    -0.09   0.931    -.1248337    .1143943
          BM     .1045976   .0480983     2.17   0.032     .0091104    .2000847
         CPI    -.0321239   .0175165    -1.83   0.070    -.0668987    .0026508
          SS     .0027765   .0106412     0.26   0.795     -.018349    .0239019
          IA     .0014669   .0044352     0.33   0.742    -.0073381    .0102718
          IB     .0073587   .0078091     0.94   0.348    -.0081443    .0228617
          AS     .0015641   .0058996     0.27   0.791    -.0101482    .0132763
          BS     .0099031   .0073816     1.34   0.183    -.0047512    .0245574
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1120                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,95)           =     24.50
       overall = 0.5490                                        max =         6
       between = 0.0171                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7206                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        21
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       126
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Table A5: The effect of independent /explanatory variables on dependent variable  
                  Return on equity (𝐑𝐎𝐄𝐢𝐭 ) 
 
Table A6: The effect of independent /explanatory variables on dependent variable 
                  Percentage of nonperforming loan to total loan and advances (  𝐍𝐏𝐋𝐢𝐭 ) 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 95) =     1.70              Prob > F = 0.0465
                                                                              
         rho     .6260267   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04437531
     sigma_u    .05741396
                                                                              
       _cons     .7941047   .5214344     1.52   0.131    -.2410735    1.829283
          PR    -3.964208   2.505745    -1.58   0.117     -8.93874    1.010324
         GDP    -1.702875   2.149971    -0.79   0.430    -5.971108    2.565358
          RP    -.4531874    .719305    -0.63   0.530    -1.881188    .9748136
          BM     .9404058   .5742169     1.64   0.105    -.1995588     2.08037
         CPI    -.2846487   .2091197    -1.36   0.177    -.6998038    .1305064
          SS    -.1820281   .1270391    -1.43   0.155    -.4342327    .0701765
          IA    -.0064588   .0529489    -0.12   0.903    -.1115758    .0986581
          IB    -.0212285   .0932282    -0.23   0.820    -.2063099    .1638528
          AS     .0790066    .070432     1.12   0.265    -.0608186    .2188318
          BS     .0637781   .0881244     0.72   0.471    -.1111709    .2387271
                                                                              
         ROE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5846                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,95)           =     13.64
       overall = 0.1685                                        max =         6
       between = 0.3071                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5894                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        21
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       126
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 95) =     6.00              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .52947179   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01094437
     sigma_u    .01160966
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1289019   .1286024    -1.00   0.319      -.38421    .1264062
          PR     .9947704   .6179969     1.61   0.111    -.2321085    2.221649
         GDP    -.9490073   .5302518    -1.79   0.077     -2.00169    .1036757
          RP    -.0072334   .1774036    -0.04   0.968    -.3594242    .3449573
          BM     .0614762   .1416203     0.43   0.665    -.2196755     .342628
         CPI      .113084   .0515756     2.19   0.031     .0106935    .2154746
          SS     .0213317   .0313319     0.68   0.498      -.04087    .0835334
          IA     .0335343   .0130589     2.57   0.012      .007609    .0594595
          IB    -.0673975   .0229931    -2.93   0.004    -.1130445   -.0217505
          AS     .0191545   .0173708     1.10   0.273    -.0153309    .0536398
          BS    -.0272155   .0217343    -1.25   0.214    -.0703636    .0159325
                                                                              
         NPL        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1360                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,95)           =     12.53
       overall = 0.3245                                        max =         6
       between = 0.0001                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5688                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        21
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       126
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Table A7: The effect of independent /explanatory variables on dependent variable cost 
                 of fund (𝐂𝐎𝐅𝐢𝐭 ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 95) =    33.25              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .88441748   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00590968
     sigma_u    .01634733
                                                                              
       _cons     .0657946    .069442     0.95   0.346    -.0720652    .2036545
          PR     1.254997   .3337026     3.76   0.000     .5925135     1.91748
         GDP    -.4800653   .2863225    -1.68   0.097    -1.048487    .0883567
          RP      .137401   .0957935     1.43   0.155    -.0527731     .327575
          BM    -.3383358   .0764713    -4.42   0.000    -.4901506    -.186521
         CPI     .0076946   .0278495     0.28   0.783    -.0475937    .0629829
          SS    -.0146971   .0169184    -0.87   0.387    -.0482845    .0188902
          IA    -.0047823   .0070515    -0.68   0.499    -.0187812    .0092167
          IB     .0038305   .0124157     0.31   0.758    -.0208177    .0284788
          AS      .018019   .0093798     1.92   0.058    -.0006022    .0366402
          BS    -.0229195    .011736    -1.95   0.054    -.0462183    .0003793
                                                                              
         COF        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1893                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,95)           =     25.98
       overall = 0.1294                                        max =         6
       between = 0.0457                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7322                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        21
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       126
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